found that, through retrospective confidence reports, participants can distinguish the validity of their mind wandering reports during a sustained attention ("metronome response") task. In addition, some participants were better able to make this distinction than others. Here, I sought to replicate both the within-and between-subjects' effects of confidence judgments on thought probe validity. To this end, I executed a preregistered close replication of Seli et al. (2015) and extended this work by administering the metronome response task twice and by measuring potential individual difference markers for which participants may be better than others at monitoring their thoughts: working memory capacity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and dispositional mindfulness. With data from 291 participants, I found only weak evidence for a within-subject effect of confidence on thought-report validity in the first administration of the metronome response task and weak to nonexistent evidence for individual differences in thought monitoring. No evidence was found for individual differences in the ability to provide valid thought reports.
Studying thoughts through introspective methods has a long and (sometimes) contentious history in psychology (Bühler, 1907; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Watson, 1913; Wundt, 1907) . Recently, the study of mind wandering has experienced rapid growth as shown by the increasing number of publications found on Google Scholar (Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 2013; Weinstein, De Lima, & van der Zee, 2017) . A popular method of pursuing questions of mind wandering relies on introspective evidence (Weinstein, 2017) , more specifically, collecting subjective reports from participants while they execute a task. Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, Cortes, and Smilek (2015) asked whether some people are better than others at introspecting (i.e., reporting on their thoughts with clarity and certainty) and whether, at the within-subject level, participants have access to metacognitive information that their ability to give accurate subjective reports varies within a task. Seli et al. interpreted their results as providing affirmative evidence to both hypotheses. That is, some participants are better than others at introspecting and participants have access to information about which subjective reports they make more accurately than others. Here, I continue this exploration of introspection by seeking to replicate Seli et al.'s results and potentially extend their findings by examining the robustness of these reports across two task administrations and testing whether cognitive and noncognitive individual difference variables predict differences in the ability to monitor and report on current thoughts. Seli et al. (2015) had participants complete a metronome response task while answering thought probes that asked participants to characterize their "mental state just before this screen appeared" as either on-task or mind wandering. Immediately following this thought probe, participants were asked to indicate how confident they were in the thought-probe response on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 ϭ not at all confident, 5 ϭ extremely confident). The metronome response task presents participants with a constant series of tones with which participants are instructed to respond synchronously with tone onsets by pressing the space bar. Previous work by Seli and colleagues (Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013; Seli et al., 2014; Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) has demonstrated that variability of participants' responses (i.e., response times) to the tones predicts the endorsement of mind wandering in response to thought probes. More specifically, when participants respond that they were mind wandering, their response time variability on the preceding five trials is greater than on five trials preceding reports of on-task. The relation between mind wandering and response time variability has also been found with go/no-go tasks (McVay & Kane, 2009 , 2012a and in latent variables formed from attentional control and memory tasks with mind wandering measures (Kane et al., 2016; Unsworth, 2015) . Thus, response time variability has assisted in validating subjective reports and appears to be a robust objective indicator of mind wandering propensity and episodes. Seli et al. (2015) found that participants who were overall more confident in their thought probe responses showed a greater distinction in response time variability between reports of on-task and mind wandering. In other words, some participants' subjective reports were more accurate than others and the confidence reports provided evidence that participants had metacognitive awareness (meta-awareness) of their report accuracy. Furthermore, when participants reported low confidence on individual responses, reports of mind wandering and on-task were not distinguished by response time variability. From these findings, Seli et al. concluded that participants can provide "reliable reports of what one might call 'introspective uncertainty. (p. 709)" Thus, it appears that Seli et al.'s findings take the relation between response time variability and subjective mind wandering reports (i.e., response time variability and reports of mind wandering are associated) further than previous research and suggests that not only are subjective thought reports generally valid, but people (some more than others) have access to fine-grained information about this validity. To explain their individual differences findings, Seli et al. suggested that some subjects may differ in their ability to be meta-aware of their current thoughts, but they did not speculate further about what may drive these individual differences.
Seli et al.'s 2015 Study

Theoretical and Practical Importance of Seli et al. (2015)
I found these results worthy of more scrutiny because individual differences in thought monitoring ability have implications for theories of cognitive control and daily life. Influential theories of cognitive control like Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001) conflict monitoring theory have proposed that people monitor their environment for conflict, when conflict is detected, cognitive control is engaged. Conflict is usually created by task conditions and is noticed because performance suffers. Here, I consider whether conflict should be thought of more generally. That is, I ask if conflict monitoring happens consciously and whether a conflict signal is generated when one finds their thoughts straying from the (experimenter-assigned) primary task to task-unrelated thoughts.
Practically, a lack of metaawareness has been suggested to play a causal role in the negative effects of mind wandering on performance with participants who score higher on attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) measures (Franklin et al., 2017) . More specifically, meta-awareness (assessed by asking participants how aware they were of their mind wandering following thought probes in reading task and in daily life) partially mediated the relation between ADHD and the negative effects of mind wandering in daily life suggesting that the ability to recognize mind wandering is critical for eventual course correction that if not instantiated can lead to the often-found negative relation between mind wandering and task performance (McVay & Kane, 2009 , 2012a , 2012b Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013; Seli, 2016; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013; Yanko & Spalek, 2014) . The rationale in Franklin et al. (2017) is that greater awareness of mind wandering produces greater cognitive control and thus less adverse effects from mind wandering. Because of the potential theoretical and practical importance of the impact of individual differences in thought monitoring, I thought it prudent to seek out potential markers of this ability.
Individual Difference Markers
Seli et al.'s individual difference finding and Franklin et al.'s ADHD-related result has the potential to explain why participants who have higher working memory capacity mind wander less in contexts where they are trying to concentrate than participants with lower working memory capacity (Kane et al., 2007 (Kane et al., , 2017 . That is, the process through which higher working memory capacity participants achieve their superior performance may be thought monitoring. The Control Failure ϫ Concerns Model of mind wandering (Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2010) maintains that variation in the propensity to mind wander is determined jointly by cognitive abilities and concerns. Currently, the processes enacted by these cognitive abilities are underspecified. Recently, Adam and Vogel (2017) suggested metacognitive monitoring may drive individual differences in visual working memory capacity. They proposed that all people may have the same "true" capacity but because some people are better than others in noticing when their attention wanes from the task at hand and correcting for this, these people exhibit a higher functional visual working memory capacity. Unsworth and Robison (2017) supply a schematic of how working memory capacity related differences in metaawareness may work out at the level of large-scale brain networks. In discussing the nature of working memory capacity and attentional control, they focus on the interplay of three brain networks: the frontoparietal network, the default mode network, and the salience network. The default mode network is associated with self2014), the latter explanation of a more sensitive fronto-parietal network is suggested if working memory capacity predicts variation in thought monitoring. If thought monitoring is a stable individual difference but working memory capacity is not related to this difference, it would reasonable to assert that the salience network is responsible.
Also, suggestive of a working memory capacity and thoughtmonitoring relation, is that mindfulness training can increase the functional limit of working memory capacity and reduce mind wandering (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Mrazek et al., 2013; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010) . Mindfulness, in its own right, is a potential individual difference marker of monitoring ability. Moore and Malinowski (2009) claim that people higher in mindfulness have greater cognitive flexibility than people with lower mindfulness (based on superior performance on a Stroop and visual discrimination tasks). Chambers et al. (2008) present evidence that, in addition to enhancing working memory capacity, increased mindfulness may lead to a greater ability to sustain attention. Perhaps more to the point, is how mindfulness is defined. A popular operationalization of the construct (Bishop et al., 2004 ; cited 4,254 times on Google Scholar as of March 24, 2018), portrays a two-component process with the first component being aware of current experiences (e.g., thoughts, feelings, and sensations) and the second focused on how these thoughts and feelings are regarded. If this is an accurate description of mindfulness, then I may expect people who are higher in mindfulness to be more aware of their thoughts than people who are less mindful. Teper, Segal, and Inzlicht (2013) propose a model for how through increased mindfulness, people can better regulate their emotions. Here, rather than test the effectiveness of mindfulness training, I test if variation in dispositional mindfulness predicts differences in the monitoring and reporting of thoughts.
Besides working memory capacity and mindfulness, I tested if the personality variables of neuroticism and conscientiousness predict thought monitoring abilities. People higher in neuroticism mind wander more than people lower in neuroticism in controlled lab studies (Kane et al., 2017; Robison, Gath, & Unsworth, 2017) . Like mind wandering, neuroticism has been associated with response time variability (Robinson & Tamir, 2005) . The relationship between neuroticism and response time variability may be driven by mind wandering. A recent proposal has suggested that neuroticism is caused by an overabundance of concerns (Perkins, Arnone, Smallwood, & Mobbs, 2015) . Although this is within the realm of possibility and fits nicely within the Control Failure ϫ Concerns model of mind wandering, it is premature to attribute neuroticism's relation to mind wandering solely to the amount of concerns. Robison et al. (2017) reported that not only did people who scored higher in neuroticism report more mind wandering, they also had lower working memory capacity and worse attentional control performance indicators than people who had lower neuroticism scores. Similarly, Fox, Dutton, Yates, Georgiou, and Mouchlianitis (2015) found that negative thought intrusions, a hallmark of neuroticism, were associated with worse performance on an attentional control task (i.e., a flanker task). These effects may be the product or antecedents of mind wandering. In the current study, I test if the neuroticism and mind wandering relation is associated with thought monitoring (and if thought monitoring is best thought of as a cognitive ability).
Evidence from work with older adults' and mind wandering has suggested that older adults mind wander less than younger adults because they are more conscientious (Jackson & Balota, 2012) . That is, because older adults were more serious about the primary task than younger adults, they reported mind wandering less. Previous work has found a positive association between conscientiousness and the propensity for self-control (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) . The few reports of mind wandering relations with conscientiousness when considered together produce inconclusive results with Jackson and Balota (2012) finding a significant negative association, Kane et al. (2017) reporting nonsignificant negative associations in both lab and daily life contexts, and Jackson, Weinstein, and Balota (2013) simply reporting no association. Here, I investigate if higher conscientiousness people are better able to control their thoughts than lower conscientiousness people because they are more invested in the task and thus more accurately monitor their thoughts.
The Current Study
The current study had four main goals, which are as follows: (1) to replicate the between-subjects moderating effect of confidence reports on the relation between subjective reports and response time variability where participants who report higher confidence than other participants provide more valid thought reports; (2) to replicate the within-subject relations among confidence reports, report type, and response time variability where on instances where a subject reports higher confidence in a subjective report those reports are more valid than instances where that participant reports lower confidence; (3) to test the robustness of these effects across two administrations of the metronome response task; (4) to determine if other individual differences markers are associated with the ability to monitor current thoughts or thought probe validity. To this end, I had a large sample of participants complete two administrations of the metronome response task, two working memory capacity tasks, and a questionnaire assessing conscientiousness, neuroticism, and dispositional mindfulness.
Method
I report how I determined the sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) . This study was preregistered on September 1, 2016 (see https://osf.io/n9yxk/).
1
Participants
Undergraduates from Western Carolina University (N ϭ 304; first-year student SAT scores ranged from 1,019 to 1,043 for cohorts entering Fall 2014 through Fall 2016) completed the informed consent for this study. I collected demographic data from 298 of these participants (data from 6 participants were lost because of technical errors). Of these 298 participants, 63% were female. Participants had a mean age of 19 (SD ϭ 2; one student errantly reported an age of 1 in the demographics; that age was not included in these statistics). Of the participants who gave ethnicity information (9 participants declined), 79% identified as White, 8% as Black, 4% as multiracial, 4% as Asian, and 2% as other. Participants received partial credit for a course requirement as compensation for their participation. The stopping rule for data collection was the end of the Spring 2016 semester or at the end of a semester when I had at least 300 participants. This sample size was chosen on the basis that correlations stabilize when approaching 250 participants (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013) , thus allowing precise estimates. I stopped collecting data at the end of the Spring 2016 semester.
Procedure
Participants volunteered to complete one 2-hr session. I administered the tasks in the following order: operation span, metronome response task (first administration), symmetry span, metronome response task (second administration), personality questionnaire, a memory task (for a project unrelated to the one presented here), and a demographic questionnaire. Experimenters read all onscreen instructions aloud while participants read along silently. All tasks were programmed and administered with E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2012).
Metronome Response Task
This task was provided by the lead author of Seli et al. (2015) . Participants (wearing headphones) pressed the space bar every time they heard a tone. The experimenter instructed the participants that the tone was presented at a constant rate (it was presented once a second) and that they should press the space bar in sync with the tone. Participants completed a total of 900 trials, broken up into 18 blocks of 50 trials each; blocks were not apparent to the participant. Within the metronome response task, participants responded to 18 embedded thought probes that appeared pseudo-randomly within the middle 40 trials of each 50-trial block. Participants responded to the probe "Which of the following responses best characterizes your mental state JUST BEFORE this screen appeared?" by pressing a designated keyboard key, indicating that either they were on-task or they were mind wandering. Immediately following the thought probe, participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale how confident they were in the accuracy of their thought report (1 ϭ not confident at all, 5 ϭ extremely confident).
From this task, I extracted three variables for analyses. Following from Seli et al., to compute response time variability, I created a five-trial moving window of response times, excluding the first five trials and five trials after each thought probe. The moving window increased incrementally, one-trial at a time. The first moving window would consist of response times from Trials 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 , and the second moving window would consist of response times from Trials 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. The first five trials of the task and the five trials following probes were not included in these windows. Finally, I computed the variance for each moving window. In addition to response time variability, I used thought probe responses and the confidence ratings that followed them.
Working Memory Capacity Complex Span Tasks
I assessed working memory capacity with two complex span tasks. In the complex span tasks, participants memorized short sequences of items while completing an interleaved processing task. Following trial sequences of unpredictable length, participants recalled the memorial items in serial order.
Before beginning the scored task, participants practiced memorizing small sets, practiced the processing task alone, and then practiced both task components together. From the processingonly practice a response deadline was determined. If on any processing-task portion of a trial, a response was not made within 2.5 standard deviations of the processing-only practice reaction time (RT) mean, the program skipped the subsequent memory stimulus and the trial was counted as a processing error. I instructed all participants that I could not use their data if they did not achieve 85% accuracy on the processing portion of the task (see Meier, Smeekens, Silvia, Kwapil, & Kane, 2018 , for a rationale for this criterion).
Operation span. Participants memorized sequences of 3 to 7 letters (letters were presented for 1 s), each presented in alternation with an arithmetic equation to verify (e.g., [3 ϫ 2] Ϫ1 ϭ 4; half were true). At recall, all 12 letters (used in the task but not in the specific trial) appeared in a grid; participants recalled each letter by selecting it with a computer mouse. Each set length of 3 to 7 occurred three times in a random order for each participant. The variable used in analyses was the total number of letters recalled in correct serial position (of 75).
Symmetry span. Participants memorized sequences of two to five red squares appearing within a matrix. Each red square appeared in alternation (presented for 650 ms) with a black-andwhite pattern made from an 8 ϫ 8 grid to verify whether it was vertically symmetrical (half were symmetrical). At recall, participants saw an empty 4 ϫ 4 matrix and mouse-clicked the red square locations. Each set length of two to five occurred three times in a random order for each participant. Each participant's score was the total number of red-square locations recalled in correct serial position (of 42).
Personality Measures
I created a computerized questionnaire to measure the constructs of conscientiousness, neuroticism, and dispositional mindfulness. In this questionnaire, I included four infrequency items (e.g., The word statistics has more letters than the word math). I dropped personality data from participants who endorsed more than one infrequency item. Conscientiousness, neuroticism, dispositional mindfulness, and infrequency items were presented in a random order for all participants. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ϭ never true, 5 ϭ always true). Scores for all three constructs were computed by averaging Likert-scale scores (after reverse scoring had been done).
Conscientiousness and neuroticism. For each construct, participants completed 12 items from the Neuroticism-ExtraversionOpenness Five Factor Inventory (McCrae & Costa, 2010 Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011) . The 24 items load onto the following five facets: acting with awareness, nonjudging of internal experience, nonreactivity to internal experience, and describing and observing. Here, I performed analyses using both the composite overall measure and the five factors.
Data Analysis
My primary approach was to follow the analytic pipeline used by Seli et al. (2015) . I augmented this pipeline by using linear mixed models (LMMs) and Bayes factors (BFs) where applicable. In places where I diverge from the preregistered analysis plan, the analyses should be considered exploratory. Unless otherwise specified, analyses were conducted in the R system for statistical analysis (R Core Team, 2017) . LMMs were carried out using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) . In the LMMs, predictors were centered on the grand mean of the sample and all models were random intercept only; p values in the LMMs were computed using the Satterthwaite approximation contained in the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015) . The Satterthwaite approximation has been shown to produce p values in line with actual false positive rates (Luke, 2017) . BFs for correlations used code is provided in an online appendix to Wagenmakers, Verhagen, and Ly (2016; see https://osf.io/cabmf/), and BFs for general linear models and analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted with the BayesFactor package (Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015) . BFs compare the predictive performance of competing models (Etz & Wagenmakers, 2017; Kass & Raftery, 1995) . I use BFs to determine which model is more likely given the data.
I followed Seli et al. (2015) in how I computed response time variability. Like Seli et al., response time variability was highly skewed, so following Seli et al., I used the natural log to transform the data (first administration of metronome response task untransformed skew ϭ 3.56, transformed skew ϭ .67; second administration of the metronome response task untransformed skew ϭ 3.88, transformed skew ϭ .38). Overall mind wandering rate (used in between-subjects analyses) was the proportion of thought probes to which the participant endorsed mind wandering. For working memory capacity, I formed a composite measure by converting raw scores to z scores and averaging them. Data, analysis code, and outputs are available at the following link: https://osf.io/n9yxk/.
Data Loss
All data exclusions were made in accord with the preregistration. I dropped all data for six participants were deemed by experimenters as noncompliant with instructions across tasks. These decisions were made without consulting the participants' data. Because of computer or experimenter error, I was missing data from two participants in the operation span task, 6 participants in the symmetry span task and personality measures, 4 participants in the first metronome task, and seven participants in the second metronome task. In addition to these exclusions, I excluded 46 participants in the operation span task and 40 participants in the symmetry span task for not making the 85% processing criterion, 14 participants' personality questionnaire data for endorsing more than one infrequency item, and 3 participants' data from the first metronome response task for responding to less than 10% of the trials. To use a participant for working memory capacity-related analyses, I required them to have scores from both the operation span task and the symmetry span task to form a composite. Using a composite for working memory capacity is theoretically consistent with the notion that working memory capacity related cognitive performance differences are driven largely by domain-general processes (Kane et al., 2004) . For all the following analyses, I used the maximum amount of data available (after these exclusions; therefore, sample sizes differ among analyses). Descriptive statistics for all tasks can be seen in Table 1 Note. MRT 1 ϭ first administration of metronome response task; MRT 2 ϭ second administration of metronome response task. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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between and internal consistency for measures can be seen in Table 2 .
Replication Results
Correlations
Replication analyses are limited to the first administration of the metronome response task. I used two different BFs in analyses of these correlations. The first approach was to test whether the data were more likely under the null hypothesis (r ϭ 0) or an (twosided) alternative hypothesis that r is different than 0. These analyses were structured so that numbers greater than one show that the data favor the alternative hypothesis and a BF of less than one shows the data support the null (values of 1 indicate that the data did not discriminate between models). For example, a BF of 3 in this setup shows that given the data the alternative hypothesis is 75% probable, whereas a BF factor of .33 shows that the null hypothesis is 75% probable. The second approach was to compute a replication BF, in these analyses, values less than one demonstrate that the probability of the null hypothesis (i.e., no relation) drops after updating the information from the initial study with the data from the replication study and values greater than one suggest that probability of the null hypothesis increases. For these replication BFs, the correlation from the initial study in the subscript brackets. For example, in the following text I compare the correlation between mind wandering propensity and response time variability in the current study with that found by Seli et 
Moderation Analysis
Like Seli et al., I conducted hierarchical regressions with response time variability being regressed on mind wandering and confidence in the first step, and the interaction of mind wandering and confidence being entered in the second step (see Table 3 ). If the model with the Mind Wandering ϫ Confidence interaction fits the data better than the model without the interaction (and the interaction parameter is positive), it suggests that people with higher confidence show a greater distinction in response time variability according to their thought probe reports than lower confidence people. More simply put, a positive interaction between mind wandering and confidence would show that some people (i.e., high-confidence people) are better able to determine if they are on-task or mind wandering than others. Contrary to Seli et al.' s result, the model with the interaction did not fit the data significantly better than the model without the interaction, ⌬R 2 ϭ .0002, F ϭ (1, 287) ϭ 0.06, p ϭ .80. Thus, confidence did not 
Repeated-Measures ANOVAs
Mirroring Seli et al., I conducted a set of two within-subject repeated-measures ANOVAs. These ANOVAs were used to test if when a participant rates their thought probe with higher confidence if that thought probe is more valid (i.e., shows a greater distinction in response time variability between on-task and mind wandering reports) than probes that are followed with a lower confidence rating. Because ANOVAs require balanced cells and many participants did not use all confidence ratings, confidence ratings were binned. Confidence reports of one and two were binned together as low confidence, reports of 3 were medium confidence, and reports of four or five were binned as high confidence. Seli et al. reported that binning reduced the percentage of missing cells from 41% to 26%. This same procedure reduced the missing cells in the current study from 44% to 28%.
The first ANOVA used data from all participants who have response time variability data in all six cells (e.g., on-task and high confidence). I had 61 participants who had data in all six cells (Seli et al.; N ϭ 22 Figure 1 Panel A for a visual depiction). In a Bayesian model comparison analysis, the intercept-only model (i.e., the model with participants as the only predictor) was the most preferred model. The interceptonly model was preferred by a factor of 18 over the main effects-only model, and by a factor of 59 over the main effects and interaction model.
The second ANOVA imputed missing data by using SPSS (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY) linear trend point estimation (this mirrors the approach used by Seli et al., 2015) , thus allowing me to use the entire sample. In this ANOVA, report type, F(1, 290) Figure 1 , Panel B). I decomposed the interaction by conducting dependent t tests between reports of on-task and mind wandering at the different confidence levels. These t tests revealed that only for high confidence reports did the mean (log) response time variability signif- Linear Mixed Models Seli et al. (2015) performed their within-subject analyses with two ANOVAs (I did the same, as I mentioned in the preceding text), one using data from all participants who had data in all cells and one where missing data was imputed. Rather than using only a subset of the data or imputing missing data based on patterns present in the existing data, I sought a statistical approach that allowed me to ask the same questions of the data, use all participants, but only use existing (rather than imputed) data. This resulted in using LMMs. LMMs accommodate unbalanced data without a loss of power and account for the nonindependence of data by using participants as a random variable (Kliegl, Wei, Dambacher, Yan, & Zhou, 2010) . In the first LMM, response time variability was predicted from confidence, report type (on-task vs. mind wandering), and their interaction. Confidence was mean centered and entered as a continuous variable. Report type was effect coded, so the parameter value reflects the difference in response time variability between on-task and mind wandering reports. Report type (b ϭ .21, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 5.9, p Ͻ .001), confidence (b ϭ Ϫ.08, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ4.4, p Ͻ .001), and the Report Type ϫ Confidence interaction (b ϭ .12, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 3.7, p Ͻ .001) all predicted unique variance in response time variability.
To further explore where on the confidence scale report type was moderated, I next conducted an LMM with confidence coded as a factor with five levels. This model did not converge. Because there were few confidence responses of 1 (2.6%; see Table 4 for confidence report distributions by report type), I binned confidence responses of one and two together. In this dummy-coded model, the binned confidence level (confidence reports of one and two) was the reference level. At the lowest confidence level report type did not predict response time variability (b ϭ .09, SE ϭ .09, t ϭ 1.0, p ϭ .34). Confidence reports of three did not significantly differ from the lowest confidence level in predicting response time variability (b ϭ Ϫ.10, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ Ϫ1.8, p ϭ .08), but confidence reports of four and five did (b ϭ Ϫ.27, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ 4.7, p Ͻ .001; b ϭ Ϫ.21, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ Ϫ3.5, p Ͻ .001), respectively, with these reports being associated with less response time variability. The slope of report type was not significantly different at confidence reports of 3 (b ϭ Ϫ.02, SE ϭ .11, t ϭ Ϫ0.2, p ϭ .87), or 4 (b ϭ .07, SE ϭ .11, t ϭ 0.6, p ϭ .58), from the slope at the lowest confidence level (i.e., the bin of confidence reports of 1 and 2), but the slope at confidence reports of five was b ϭ .35, SE ϭ .11, t ϭ 3.1, p ϭ .002, indicating that the Confidence ϫ Report Type interaction seen in the initial LMM was driven primarily by the highest confidence responses.
To qualify this inference that only the highest confidence responses were responsible for the report type by confidence interaction, I ran separate models with confidence reports of 3 and 4 as the reference levels. In these models, I focused on the parameter reflecting the effect of report type on response time variability and the interaction of how this relation changes at the different confidence levels (for comparisons not contained in the previous model). In the model with confidence level three as the reference, report type did not predict response time variability (b ϭ .07, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ 1.0, p ϭ .31), this relation did not significantly differ at confidence reports of 4 (b ϭ Ϫ.10, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ Ϫ1.8, p ϭ .08) but did significantly differ at confidence reports of 5 (b ϭ .37, SE ϭ .09, t ϭ 4.0, p Ͻ .001). In the model with confidence level four as the reference, report type did predict response time variability (b ϭ .15, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ 2.2, p ϭ .03) and the slope of report type got steeper when a confidence level of 5 was indicated (b ϭ .29, SE ϭ .09, t ϭ 3.2, p Ͻ .001).
Replication Discussion
Here, I attempted to replicate the between-subjects and within-subject effects of confidence ratings on thought probe validity. At the individual differences level, I found no evidence that some participants were better at monitoring their thoughts than others. Although I found corroborating evidence that overall mind wandering propensity is positively associated with response time variability (Seli, Carriere, et al., 2013; Seli, Jonker, et al., 2013; Seli et al., 2014, Within-subject analyses revealed a more mixed pattern. The ANOVA with only complete cases did not contribute confirming evidence that when participants give a higher confidence rating for their thought probe response, those thought probes have more validity. The ANOVA with imputed data and LMMs using all the participants did provide evidence that probes associated with higher confidence have more validity. Moreover, the LMMs suggested that probe reports followed by the highest confidence ratings drive this relationship. Two pieces of evidence suggest that these within-subject effects are not robust. First, Bayesian model comparison on the ANOVA showed that the data did not distinguish between the model with the interaction and the model without the Report Type ϫ Confidence interaction. That is, although there is some signal from a frequentist perspective (as indicated by the p value of .005), it is (almost) nonexistent through a Bayesian model-comparison perspective. Second, the effect sizes associated with Report Type ϫ Confidence rating interaction are quite modest (e.g., from the ANOVA with data from participants with complete data p 2 ϭ .03; from the ANOVA with imputed data p 2 ϭ .02; these effect sizes were smaller those by those produced by Seli et al. who had an p 2 ϭ .20 for the complete cases ANOVA and an p 2 ϭ .07 for the imputed data ANOVA). The modest effect sizes are also reflected in the fact that in the ANOVA with fewer participants (i.e., the ANOVA with complete cases), none of the predictors reached conventional statistical significance. Prior work by Seli et al. (2014) does provide evidence that participants may be able to provide more detailed information about their thoughts if they are asked to respond to thought probes using a five-point Likert scale (1 ϭ completely on task, 2 ϭ mostly on task, 3 ϭ both on the task and thinking about unrelated concerns, 4 ϭ mostly thinking about unrelated concerns, 5 ϭ completely thinking about unrelated concerns). Seli et al. (2014) found a strong association between the thought probe response and response time variability (and fidgeting) with more off task concerns associated with more response time variability (and fidgeting).
On the basis of the findings of Seli et al. (2015) and the findings presented here, I tentatively conclude that participants cannot authoritatively comment on the validity of thought probes by completing retrospective confidence reports. To be clear, the evidence does suggest that confidence reports of four or five are associated with a greater distinction of response time variability between on-task and mind wandering reports but based on the effect sizes, Bayesian model comparison, and the different pattern of results found by Seli et al. (i.e ., a quadratic effect) and those produced here (a more exponential effect) these effects appear relatively weak and noisy. I acknowledge that the current procedure differs from the original by having participants first complete an operation span task. It is plausible that by having participants complete a moderately demanding attentional task before the metronome task reduced their ability or motivation to monitor their thought in the metronome response task (Brewer, Lau, Wingert, Ball, & Blais, 2017) and that without first completing the operation span task these within-subject effects would be more pronounced.
Although I found no evidence that mean confidence moderates the report type and response time variability relation, in the introduction I gave a rationale for other possible individual difference variables that may predict which participants will be better able to monitor their thoughts than others. As is described in the following text, I tested whether these markers are effective at predicting thought probe validity and thought monitoring. In addition, I had questions as to what extent thought monitoring is a stable individual difference. To address this, I administered the metronome response task again. By administering the metronome response task again, I could assess testretest validity on response time variability, overall mind wandering propensity, overall confidence (see Table 2 for intercorrelations). I also created an index of monitoring accuracy and compared this across the two administrations.
Extension Results
Metronome response task second administration correlations. Here, when I calculated the replication BF, I entered the correlation I found in the first administration (rather than the one from Seli et al.) . The question this second BF [0R] is answering is if the correlation obtained in the second administration is if the probability of the null hypothesis increases or decreases when incorporating the information from the second administration. Values less than 1 indicate the null hypothesis is less probable and values greater than 1 indicate the null is more probable (values close to 1 suggest that probability of the null is relatively unaffected by the incorporation of data from the seconnd administration). Mind wandering propensity was again positively associated with overall response time variability, r (289) 78 . From these results, we can conclude that the data from the second metronome response task are mostly consistent with data from the first administration of the metronome response task and the most robust association in this data is between mind wandering propensity and response time variability.
Moderation analysis. Here, I again followed the approach by Seli et al. and used a hierarchical regression approach and compared a model with mind wandering and confidence as predictors to a model with mind wandering, confidence, and their interaction as predictors. As in the first administration, the fit of the model did not significantly improve with the addition of the interaction, ⌬R 2 ϭ .000002, F ϭ (1, 287) ϭ 0.19, p ϭ .67 (see Table 3 for all parameter estimates). With the Bayesian model comparison, the model without the interaction was preferred by a factor of four over the model with the interaction.
Metronome response task second administration repeated measures. The binning procedure reduced the percentage of missing cells from 50% to 37%. In the ANOVA with participants who had data in all six cells (N ϭ 41), when participants reported mind wandering they had greater response time variability, F(1, 40) ϭ 9.36, MSE ϭ 0.61, p ϭ .004, p 2 ϭ .19, but the effect of confidence, F(2, 80) ϭ 2.71, MSE ϭ 0.67, p ϭ .07, p 2 ϭ .06, and the interaction between report type and confidence, F(2, 80) ϭ 1.90, MSE ϭ 0.50, p ϭ .10, p 2 ϭ .06, did not reach the conventional criterion for statistical significance (see Figure 2 Panel A). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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In the Bayesian model comparison (with the intercept-only model as the reference level), the model with the intercept and report type was the most preferred (BF ϭ 16), followed by the main effects model (i.e., report type and confidence; BF ϭ 8), and then by the main effects plus interaction model (BF ϭ 4). When focusing on what the confidence by report type interaction adds to the model, the main effects model was favored by a factor of two over the main effects-plus-interaction model. When using the same model with imputed data, report type F(1, 290) ϭ 100.75, MSE ϭ 0.59, p ϭ Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .26, and confidence, F(2, 580) ϭ 2.71, MSE ϭ 5.43, p ϭ .005, p 2 ϭ .02, both predicted response time variability, but the interaction between report type and confidence, F(2, 580) ϭ 1.80, MSE ϭ 0.52, p ϭ .16, p 2 ϭ .01, did not (see Figure 2 , Panel B). In comparison to the intercept only model, Bayesian model comparison most favored the main effects model (BF ϭ 8.0e ϩ 19), followed by the model with the intercept and report type (BF ϭ 3.2e ϩ 19) and the full-effects-plus-interaction model (BF ϭ 4.86e ϩ 18). When comparing the main effects model to the main effects-plusinteraction model, the main effects model was favored by a factor of 17.
Linear mixed model. This model predicted response time variability with report type, confidence, and their interaction. Report type (b ϭ .28, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 6.9, p Ͻ .001), and confidence (b ϭ Ϫ.05, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ2.8, p ϭ .006), predicted response time variability, but the report type by confidence interaction did not (b ϭ .03, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 0.8, p ϭ .45).
Working memory capacity moderation analysis. Like the moderation analyses with confidence ratings performed above, I compared models predicting response time variability. One model had report type and working memory capacity as predictors and the other had report type, working memory capacity, and their interaction (i.e., Working Memory Capacity ϫ Report Type) as predictors (for parameter estimates from both task administrations see Table 5 ). The question I attempted to answer with this analysis is as follows: Are people with higher working memory capacity better at providing more valid responses to their thought probes than people with lower working memory capacity? I did this analysis for both administrations of the metronome response task (both Ns ϭ 220). In the first administration, the model with the interaction did not fit the data better than the model without ⌬R 2 ϭ .007, F ϭ (1, 216) ϭ 1.63, p ϭ .20. In the Bayesian model comparison, the model without the interaction was favored the data by a factor of four over the model with the interaction. In the second administration, the model with the interaction also did not improve the model fit over the model without the interaction ⌬R 2 ϭ .002, F ϭ (1, 216) ϭ 0.46, p ϭ .50. For the second administration, the Bayesian model comparison favored the model without the interaction by a factor of three and one half over the model with the interaction. These results provide evidence that thought probe validity is not a function of working memory capacity variation.
Working memory capacity LMM. To directly assess working memory capacity related differences in thought monitoring (rather than indirectly through probe validity like the immediately preceding analysis), I conducted LMMs on both metronome response task administrations. The key parameter in these models is the three-way interaction among report type, confidence, and the individual difference marker. For example, in this model with working memory capacity, if we see a significant three-way interaction it may indicate that when higher working memory capacity people are more confident, we see a larger distinction between on-task and mind wandering reports in terms of response time variability.
In these LMMs predicting response time variability, I entered report type, confidence, and working memory capacity and their interactions as predictors. Report type was effect coded. Confidence and working memory capacity were mean centered and treated as continuous variables. In the first metronome response task, report type (b ϭ .18, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 4.3, p Ͻ .001), confidence (b ϭ Ϫ.06, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ3.0, p ϭ .003), working memory capacity (b ϭ Ϫ.23, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ Ϫ4.1, p Ͻ .001), and the report This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ), and confidence and working memory capacity (b ϭ Ϫ.03, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ Ϫ1.1, p ϭ .27), did not. In this model, the three-way interaction among report type, confidence, and working memory capacity, did reach conventional statistical significance (b ϭ .10, SE ϭ .05, t ϭ 2.0, p ϭ .046).
To interpret this interaction, I conducted separate models for mind wandering and on-task reports. In the model examining just reports of on-task, working memory capacity did (b ϭ Ϫ.18, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ Ϫ2.5, p ϭ .01), and confidence did not (b ϭ Ϫ.03, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ Ϫ0.8, p ϭ .42), predict unique variance in response time variability. Most importantly, the Confidence ϫ Working Memory capacity was nonsignificant but had a negative slope (b ϭ Ϫ.05, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ Ϫ1.3, p ϭ .21). In the model of mind wandering reports, working memory capacity was again associated with less response time variability (b ϭ Ϫ.17, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ Ϫ2.4, p ϭ .02). Here, confidence just missed the statistical significance criterion (b ϭ Ϫ.10, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 2.0, p ϭ .051), and the Confidence ϫ Working Memory Capacity was nonsignificant but positive (b ϭ .03, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 0.7, p ϭ .47). Recall that this analysis was conducted to better understand the three-way interaction among working memory capacity, confidence, and report type. When on-task was reported, the parameter estimate for the Working Memory Capacity ϫ Confidence interaction had a negative slope providing evidence that when higher working memory capacity participants reported with high confidence, they exhibited less response time variability than lower-working memory capacity participants when they provided high confidence reports. When mind wandering was reported, the parameter estimate for the Working Memory Capacity ϫ Confidence interaction was positive suggesting that when higher working memory capacity participants reported mind wandering with high confidence they showed a greater increase in response time variability than did lower working memory capacity participants when going from low to high confidence. This result does provide some evidence for working memory capacity related differences in thought monitoring. But I consider this evidence very weak because it is only found in one task administration and p values that close to .05 have been shown to provide very weak evidential value (Benjamin et al., 2017) .
Conscientiousness moderation analysis. Adding the Conscientiousness ϫ Report Type interaction did not significantly improve the fit of the model over the model that had conscientiousness and report type as predictors, ⌬R 2 ϭ .009, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 2.55, p ϭ .11 (for parameter estimates from both task administrations see Table 6 ). Here, the BF was not able to distinguish these two models (BF ϭ 1.35 in favor of the model without interaction). The Conscientiousness ϫ Report Type interaction also did not significantly improve the model fit in the second administration of the metronome response task, ⌬R 2 ϭ .005, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 1.46, p ϭ .23. The model without the conscientiousness and report type This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
interaction was favored by a factor of two (BF ϭ 2.26) over the model with the interaction. Conscientiousness LMM. In the first metronome response task, in a model with report type, confidence, and conscientiousness predicting response time variability, report type (b ϭ .21, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 5.6, p Ͻ .001), confidence, (b ϭ Ϫ.07, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ3.8, p Ͻ .001), and the Report Type ϫ Confidence interaction (b ϭ .12, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 3.6, p Ͻ .001), were all significantly associated with response time variability. Conscientiousness (b ϭ Ϫ.03, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ Ϫ0.4, p ϭ .69), the Report Type ϫ Conscientiousness interaction (b ϭ Ϫ.09, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ Ϫ1.3, p ϭ .18), the Confidence ϫ Conscientiousness interaction (b ϭ .02, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 0.6, p ϭ .56), nor the three-way interaction among report type, confidence and conscientiousness (b ϭ .01, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ 0.1, p ϭ .93) did.
The model with conscientiousness, report type, and confidence from the second administration of the metronome response task found again that report type (b ϭ .29, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 3.6, p Ͻ .001), and confidence (b ϭ Ϫ.05, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ2.8, p ϭ .004), predicted unique variance in response time variability. But unlike the model on the first administration, the Report Type ϫ Confidence interaction did not (b ϭ .03, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 0.7, p ϭ .48). In addition, in this model the parameter representing the Report Type ϫ Conscientiousness interaction was significantly associated with response time variability (b ϭ Ϫ.20, SE ϭ .08, t ϭ Ϫ2.5, p Ͻ .001). In separate models for on-task and mind wandering reports, the parameter estimate for conscientiousness was nonsignificantly positive for reports of on-task (b ϭ .05, SE ϭ .09, t ϭ 0.6, p ϭ .58), and nonsignificantly negative for reports of mind wandering (b ϭ Ϫ.16, SE ϭ .09, t ϭ Ϫ1.7, p ϭ .09). These conscientiousness parameters from these two models are the opposite of what one would expect if conscientiousness was associated with more accurate thought monitoring and thus more valid thought probe reporting. The most direct measure of monitoring, the three-way interaction among report type, confidence, and conscientiousness was nonsignificant (b ϭ Ϫ.08, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ Ϫ1.2, p ϭ .23).
Neuroticism moderation analysis. Neuroticism did not moderate the relation between report type and response time variability in the first administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .001, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .33, p ϭ .59 (for parameter estimates from both task administrations see Table 7 ). The model without the interaction was favored by a factor of 4 (BF ϭ 3.86) over the model with the interaction. In the second administration of the metronome response task, the neuroticism and report type interaction also did not significantly improve the model fit, ⌬R 2 ϭ .008, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 2.50, p ϭ .12.
Bayesian model comparison was not able to distinguish between the models with and without the interaction (BF ϭ 1.4 in favor of the model without the interaction). Neuroticism LMM. Following a now familiar pattern, in both metronome response tasks administrations report type, first administration (b ϭ .21, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 5.5, p Ͻ .001) and second administration (b ϭ .28, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 6.6, p Ͻ .00), and confidence, first administration (b ϭ Ϫ.07, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ3.9, p Ͻ .001) and second administration (b ϭ Ϫ.05, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ2.8, p ϭ .004), both predicted unique variance in response time variability, and in only the first administration the Report Type ϫ Confidence interaction did, first administration (b ϭ .12, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 3.5, p Ͻ .001), second administration (b ϭ .02, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 0.7, p ϭ .51). In neither the first administration nor the second administration did any of the other two-way interactions (Neuroticism ϫ Confidence, first administration: b ϭ .02, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 0.7, p ϭ .50; second administration: b ϭ .01, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 0.3, p ϭ .78; Report Type ϫ Neuroticism, first administration: b ϭ .05, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ 0.9, p ϭ .39, second administration: b ϭ .08, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ 1.0, p ϭ .30) or the three-way interaction among report type, confidence, and neuroticism reach statistical significance (first administration: b ϭ .00, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ 0.0, p ϭ .98; second administration: b ϭ .03, SE ϭ .06, t ϭ 0.5, p ϭ .62).
Dispositional mindfulness moderation analysis. Dispositional mindfulness also did not moderate the report type and response time variability relation in the first administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .00005, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .01, p ϭ .90 (for parameter estimates from both task administrations see Table 8 ). Here, the model without the interaction was favored by a factor of 4 (BF ϭ 4.41) over the model with the interaction. Dispositional mindfulness again did not moderate the relation in the second administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .006, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 1.74, p ϭ .19. The model without the interaction was favored by a factor of 2 over the model with the interaction. In addition to the total dispositional mindfulness score not moderating the report and response time variability relation, neither did any of the five facets of this scale (BFs all in favor of the model without the interaction; Acting with Awareness in the first metronome response task: ⌬R 2 ϭ .0003, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .09, p ϭ .76, BF ϭ 4.2; Acting with Awareness in the second metronome response task: ⌬R 2 ϭ .00003, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .01, p ϭ .93, BF ϭ 4.4; nonjudging of internal experience in the first metronome response task: ⌬R 2 ϭ .000001, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .0003, p ϭ .98, BF ϭ 4.5; nonjudging of internal experience in the second metronome response task: ⌬R 2 ϭ .0002, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .07, p ϭ .80, BF ϭ 4.4; nonreactivity to internal experience in the first This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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MEIER metronome response task, ⌬R 2 ϭ .004, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 1.2, p ϭ .28, BF ϭ 2.6; nonreactivity to internal experience in the second metronome response task, ⌬R 2 ϭ .007, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 2.1, p ϭ .15, BF ϭ 1.7; observation in the first metronome response task administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .006, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 1.7, p ϭ .20, BF ϭ 2.1; Observation in the second metronome response task administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .0002, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ .05, p ϭ .82, BF ϭ 1.1; Description in the first metronome response task administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .006, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 1.7, p ϭ .20, BF ϭ 2.2; Description in the second metronome response task administration, ⌬R 2 ϭ .005, F ϭ (1, 273) ϭ 1.6, p ϭ .21, BF ϭ 2.2).
Dispositional mindfulness LMMs. The LMMs for the overall dispositional mindfulness score also provided no evidence for dispositional mindfulness-related individual differences in thought monitoring. In both models, report type, first administration (b ϭ .20, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 5.4, p Ͻ .001), second administration (b ϭ .29, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 6.7, p Ͻ .001), and confidence were associated with unique variance in response time variability. In the first model, the Report Type ϫ Confidence interaction was a significant predictor (b ϭ .12, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ 3.5, p Ͻ .001), and in the second model it was not (b ϭ .03, SE ϭ .04, t ϭ 0.8, p ϭ .43). The parameter estimate for dispositional mindfulness did not reach statistical significance in either model, first administration (b ϭ Ϫ.15, SE ϭ .12, t ϭ Ϫ1.3, p ϭ .21), second administration (b ϭ Ϫ.13, SE ϭ .13, t ϭ Ϫ1.1, p ϭ .29), but the dispositional Mindfulness ϫ Confidence parameter did in the second administration (b ϭ .10, SE ϭ .05, t ϭ 2.0, p ϭ .044), but not the first administration (b ϭ Ϫ.01, SE ϭ .05, t ϭ Ϫ0.2, p ϭ .87). The interaction between report type and dispositional mindfulness was not associated with response time variability in either the first (b ϭ Ϫ.01, SE ϭ .11, t ϭ Ϫ0.1, p ϭ .89), or second metronome response task administration (b ϭ Ϫ.23, SE ϭ .12, t ϭ Ϫ1.8, p ϭ .06), nor was the three-way interaction among dispositional mindfulness, confidence, and report type, first administration (b ϭ .09, SE ϭ .09, t ϭ 1.0, p ϭ .32) and second administration (b ϭ .00, SE ϭ .10, t ϭ 0.0, p ϭ .97).
Because this article is already results laden, I only briefly comment on the most germane aspects of the LMMs on the five separate facets of mindfulness measured. Supplemental tables including all parameter estimates, standard errors, t values, and p values for these models are available at the following link: https:// osf.io/n9yxk/. None of the critical three-way interactions among the mindfulness facets (i.e., acting with awareness, nonjudging of internal experience, nonreactivity to internal experience, observing, and describing), confidence, and report type reached statistical significance. With few exceptions the models followed the now familiar pattern of report type, confidence and their interaction reaching statistical significance in the first administration, and only report type and confidence reaching statistical significance in the second administration.
Omnibus linear mixed model. In this model, I predicted response time variability with report type, working memory capacity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and dispositional mindfulness and their interactions as the predictors. Working memory capacity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and dispositional mindfulness were entered as mean-centered continuous variables. Report type was effect coded. I ran separate models for each metronome response task administration. In the first administration model (see Table 9 for all parameter estimates, standard errors, degrees of freedom, t values, and p values), three parameters reached statistical significance: Report type (b ϭ .19, SE ϭ .05, t ϭ 3.8, p Ͻ .001), with reports of mind wandering associated with more response time variability, and working memory capacity (b ϭ Ϫ.20, SE ϭ .07, t ϭ Ϫ2.8, p ϭ .006), with higher working memory capacity participants exhibiting less response time variability than participants with lower working memory capacity. In addition, the four-way interaction among report type, dispositional mindfulness, neuroticism and working memory capacity predicted response time variability (b ϭ Ϫ.91, SE ϭ .30, t ϭ Ϫ3.1, p ϭ .002). I judged this interaction to be uninterpretable. In the second administration (see Table 10 for details), report type again predicted response time variability (b ϭ .27, SE ϭ .05, t ϭ 5.0, p Ͻ 001; i.e., report of mind wandering being associated with greater response time variability), as did the same four-way interaction of report type, dispositional mindfulness, neuroticism and working memory capacity (b ϭ Ϫ.81, SE ϭ .37, t ϭ Ϫ2.2, p ϭ .03), which I again judged to be uninterpretable.
Monitoring ability index point-biserial correlations. As an index of monitoring ability, for every participant I computed the point-biserial correlation between the report type (0 ϭ on-task, 1 ϭ mind wandering) and response time variability with the idea being that participants who are better than others at monitoring would show a stronger positive relation. More simply put, participants who are more accurate at monitoring their thoughts would exhibit a greater distinction in response time variability between their on-task and mind wandering reports. This monitoring ability index was only able to be computed for participants who chose both report types (in the 18 thought probes) within a single administration. Descriptive statistics for this monitoring index for both administrations can be found in Table 1 . These indexes 
Extension Discussion
The correlational analyses that repeated from the first to second administration of the metronome response tasks lead to the same inferences as made for the first administration. Mind wandering is positively associated with response time variability, but only weakly (and nonsignificantly) related to confidence, whereas confidence and response time variability were not associated. Again, in the hierarchical regressions, confidence ratings did not moderate the association between mind wandering and response time variability suggesting that some participants were not able to access or report fine-grained metacognitive information about the thought report validity better than others. In this second administration, none of the within-participant analyses provide evidence that participants were either willing or able to continue to discriminate the validity of their subjective self-reports by confidence ratings.
I assessed putative individual difference markers of monitoring ability in both metronome response administrations. Neither working memory capacity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, nor dispositional mindfulness (composite or individual facets) moderated the mind wandering and response time variability relation in either task administration. In the LMMs, the only statistically significant three-way interaction (representing individual differences in monitoring) was for working memory capacity in the second administration of the metronome response task. Finally, I computed an index of monitoring ability and assessed whether monitoring (as measured) is a stable individual difference. Only a weak relation was found, and the Bayesian model comparison suggested the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis by slightly greater than a factor of three. Because the association between monitoring indexes did not meet the a priori criterion (r ϭ .30), I did not pursue any further analyses with this monitoring index.
General Discussion
Seli et al. found evidence for individual differences in the ability to monitor thoughts. In their study, high-confidence participants showed a greater difference in response time vari- Note. WMC ϭ working memory capacity.
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MEIER ability between reports of being on-task or mind wandering suggesting that some people either have higher fidelity thoughts (i.e., less noisy representations) or more fine-tuned assessment of these thoughts. With a large sample of participants, I found no evidence of robust individual differences in conscious thought monitoring or in thought probe validity. In two administrations of the metronome response task, I found the established association of mind wandering with response time variability, but neither retrospective confidence ratings, working memory capacity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, nor dispositional mindfulness moderated this relation. Although I found no evidence for individual differences in thought report validity and only very weak evidence for individual differences in thought monitoring, I did find support for two other findings that Seli et al. described as key: (1) variation in the confidence ratings that participants provide with the distributions of confidence reports being remarkably similar to those found in Seli et al. (see Table 4 for comparisons across studies and administrations) and (2) some support for the within-subject findings that when participants reported low confidence, response time variability did not significantly differ between reports of on-task and mind-wandering. However, regarding the within-subject results, this support was only found in the first administration of the metronome response task and even there, when considering Bayesian model comparisons and effect sizes, does not appear robust.
If we see individual differences in rates of mind wandering but cannot find individual differences in the consciously available monitoring of mind wandering, control mechanisms other than conscious monitoring are implicated. In other words, if I assume that for a subject to redirect their thoughts back to the primary task, they first notice they are off task and then shift their attention, the result of no robust individual differences in noticing suggests the differences lie in the ability to volitionally shift. Thus, this finding narrows the control processes under consideration in the Control Failures ϫ Concerns Model of mind wandering. Adding more specificity to this model will allow it to make more precise predictions (and progress) in future work.
Examining the relation between thought probes, confidence, and response time variability is not the only way to assess meta-awareness. Another way is to contrast rates of self-caught to experimenter-caught mind wandering. In studies using this approach, in addition to encountering thought probes within the task, participants are also instructed to press a designated button when they catch themselves mind wandering. Meta-awareness is gauged as the ratio of self-caught to experimenter-caught probes. That is, more aware participants (should) have a higher Note. WMC ϭ working memory capacity.
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AWARENESS OF MIND WANDERING rate of self-caught to probe-caught mind wandering than less aware participants. Until recently, the findings in the current study regarding individual differences in monitoring of thoughts jibed well with work that has used this method. Prior to the most recently published work with this method (Seli, Smilek, Ralph, & Schacter, 2018) , only experimenter-caught mind wandering had shown a relationship with task performance (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Sayette, Schooler, & Reichle, 2010) . Seli et al. (2018) have provided the first evidence in the self-caught paradigm for an association between self-caught probes and task performance suggesting that this may yet be a fruitful avenue of research into aspects of mind wandering awareness. One salient difference between Seli et al. (2018) and the prior self-caught probe studies is the sample size. Seli et al. found evidence of an association with 105 participants (in two separate samples); the three earlier studies cited above that failed to detect the association had sample sizes ranging from 40 to 52. Likewise, recent work has highlighted the role psychometric properties of tasks play in replication attempts of individual differences work (Cooper, Gonthier, Barch, & Braver, 2017) . Specifically, the role of psychometric reliability in limiting the magnitude of potential correlations seems relevant here. For instance, if Seli et al.'s (2015) finding of a positive correlation between confidence and mind wandering was substantially different in the replication attempt and the reliability of these measures was substantially lower in this attempt, the discrepancy between the two studies can be attributed to the lower reliability. Low reliability does not seem to be an issue in the current experiment, as seen in Tables 1 and 2 , the measures used in the replication analyses had ample variation and are not affected by floor or ceiling effects. These measures all had Cronbach's alphas of greater than .80 (deemed as adequate for basic research by Nunnally, 1978) , and test-retest correlations of greater than .70. However, psychometric issues may very well account for the lack of evidence of stable individual differences found with the monitoring ability index. Although these indexes showed ample variation, their test-retest correlation was only .10 and nonsignificant. My attempt to assess this was by creating within-subject correlations between thought reports and response time variability. Because these correlations were based on only 18 observations, these correlations are noisy measures (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013) , thus limiting the statistical power. Future work in investigating individual differences in monitoring ability must use high-powered designs to produce evidential value. Although the attempt to create an index of monitoring ability was ineffective, it does not subtract from the evidential value provided by the other analyses.
Because the truth is not (usually) revealed by any one study and sampling error can either effect the original, the replication, or both studies, my interpretation of these two studies will be constrained. There are many positive attributes of this replication and extension study that may cause one to weigh its results more heavily than the original. The larger sample size allows the estimation of effects with more precision, preregistration limited the analytical and data collection flexibility (making the p values interpretable), and analyses performed by Seli et al. were supplemented by incorporating a Bayesian approach and LMMs. In addition to these attributes, I am confident in the results because the expected pattern of results in associations that were not the critical focus here were found. For example, response time variability and mind wandering were significantly positively associated in both metronome response task administrations (first administration, r ϭ .18, p ϭ .001, BF 10 ϭ 11; second administration, r ϭ .20, p ϭ .0004, BF 10 ϭ 41), neuroticism and conscientiousness were significantly negatively associated (r ϭ Ϫ.43, p Ͻ .00001, BF 10 ϭ 56,470,715,959), and working memory capacity and response time variability were negatively associated in both administrations (first administration, r ϭ Ϫ.26, p ϭ .00007, BF 10 ϭ 220; second administration, r ϭ Ϫ.19, p ϭ .005, BF 10 ϭ 4). These expected patterns work as positive controls, strongly suggesting that if individual-differences variables (in this sample) did moderate the relation between subjective and objective measures of mind wandering, they would have been found (i.e., this study does not suffer from measurement problems in general).
To foster a more efficient accumulation of knowledge, I provide constraints on the generalizability of the findings (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017) . I expect the results reported here to generalize to lab-based measures of mind wandering and meta-awareness. To my knowledge, these relations have not been tested outside of the lab. Recently, Kane et al. (2017) have communicated evidence that relations among mind wandering and other constructs differ between these two settings (i.e., lab vs. out of lab). Moreover, the claims reported here are specific to younger adults. Older and younger adults (in the lab) have shown divergent patterns in their reporting of mind wandering (Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013) . Because the present analyses included a measure of cognitive ability (i.e., working memory capacity) that is associated with fluid intelligence and very little moderation was found, these results are expected generalize no matter the cognitive ability of the sample.
Conclusion
Seli et al. suggested that participants "are able to provide more valid and reliable reports" about the certainty with which they respond to thought probes. The evidence contained here calls this assertion into doubt and suggests that all participants monitor their mind wandering with only limited resolution. Thus, as has already been established, thought probes are valid (but noisy) measures of on versus off-task thinking, but participants are limited in their ability to qualify these reports. Although the study of mind wandering is continually yielding new findings and building out the nomological network, it appears there are some topics of study (e.g., qualification of thought probe responses) that are not well suited to be revealed by subjective thought reports alone. Because participants cannot comment authoritatively on some aspects of mind wandering experiences, more objective measures like pupillometry (Konishi, Brown, Battaglini, & Smallwood, 2017) may be most efficient path forward. To be clear, I am not claiming that individual differences in thought monitoring do not exist, I am claiming that the evidence provided in Seli et al. (2015) and the
